A small share of the aircraft we track are enrolled in FAA privacy programs meant to keep them off flight-tracking sites. Against a site built the way this one is, they mostly do not work, and it is worth being precise about why.
LADD only limits the FAA’s own feed
The FAA’s Limiting Aircraft Data Displayed (LADD) program, formerly BARR, lets an owner ask the FAA to suppress their aircraft from the data the FAA shares with third-party vendors. It does not, and cannot, stop the aircraft’s own ADS-B broadcast.
Because we work from the public broadcast rather than the FAA feed, a LADD-listed aircraft is still in plain view: the airplane keeps transmitting its position in the clear. This is the same reason other public flight-tracking sites lawfully display LADD-listed aircraft.
LADD is also too common to mean much on its own. A large share of the tails we follow, across every kind of owner, are on the list. It is a routine privacy posture, not a signal that a particular aircraft is hiding something.
PIA hides the registry link, not the plane
A smaller number of operators use the FAA’s Privacy ICAO Address (PIA) program. PIA lets a U.S.-registered aircraft broadcast a temporary, alternate identifier (an ICAO hex code) that is not linked to its real tail number in the public Civil Aviation Registry, and the FAA treats the mapping between the two as exempt from public-records requests.
Even under PIA, the aircraft is still broadcasting. Only the registry linkage is hidden. The airplane still flies the same routes, in and out of the same home airports, on the same kinds of schedules.
Re-identification is inference, not proof
Where a previously-tracked aircraft goes quiet and a new privacy identity appears flying that same pattern, we may note the likely connection based on route-pattern analysis of public signals.
This is inference, not proof. A pattern match is our best read of public data. It is not an FAA registry confirmation, and it is not proof that two transmissions come from the same airframe. We label these attributions as probable, and we say so plainly on the page. PIA is also a genuine blind spot: sometimes we simply cannot see behind it, and we do not pretend otherwise.
A separate lever: hiding the owner
LADD and PIA hide where a plane flies. A different change hides who owns it. As of mid-2026 the FAA withholds registered-owner names from its public registry by default. We froze a snapshot of the registry before that change took effect, to preserve the pre-redaction baseline, and we resolve ownership through primary corporate and securities filings. More on that in how we source flight records.
Why this is public information
ADS-B broadcasts are unencrypted by design. Air traffic control, other aircraft, and any hobbyist with a receiver can hear them, which is what makes the system work safely. Collecting and reporting on those public signals, and the public records that go with them, is open-source research. Our subject is the aircraft and the institution behind it, never a way to find where a specific person is at a given moment. See our Editorial & Ethics policy.